T.E. Lawrence 's Art of War

Johnson’s book centers around “the military theory and the tactical or strategic aspects of insurgency” which are parceled out in the chapters as “distinctive features of irregular warfare.” (p. 18) He wisely does not attempt to address Lawrence outside of his ideas regarding warfare - discussions of anything else better left to others. In his well-researched work, he used a panoply of sources to produce sixteen chapters, such as,

· Chapter #2 “Depth not Face: The Making of an Insurgency,”

· Chapter #9 “Fighting Alongside Local Forces,”

· Chapter #12 “Hybrid Warfare: Air and Mobile Operations,” and

· Chapter #14 “Lawrence on Strategy and Politics.”

Other chapters covered strategy, the importance of maneuvering and extending the enemy’s flank, effective raiding methods, thoughts on deep battle and the ever-present importance of politics (both local and international) as other relevant topics to better understand his experiences.

Johnson argues that Lawrence knew the Arab insurgents could not stand up to the Ottomans with their German allies in conventional battle, so he instead emphasized a “dual strategy” which focused on “avoid(ing) combat in favour of strikes upon the material fabric of his enemy” and “to develop a political strategy that would render military operations irrelevant.” (p. 18) Johnson further argues that Lawrence understood the importance of often intangible elements like morale and the psychological dimensions of the insurgent experience that might have been lost on others. As an academic, Lawrence approached his craft with “intense study” (p. 21) which allowed him to learn a wide range of skills because of his force of will and desire to bring all those skills to bear, not knowing when he might need to fire a machine gun, doctor a camel, or plant explosives, but having prepared to do each of them, nonetheless.

In 1916, Lawrence arrived in the Middle East and eventually developed a solution for the problem that faced the British of how to effectively influence events while not deploying large numbers of troops. He advocated for an advisory approach, in which only select military personnel would work with the Arabs, teaching them how to use the equipment and other skills they would need to manage modern warfare with unfamiliar kit while keeping the costs and manpower investment low using a “light footprint” (p. 45) style. This mirrors the common modern practice of sending highly-skilled special forces personnel to teach indigenous personnel, which continues around the world currently as a cost-effective way to project power without major troop deployments or unwanted public scrutiny. As an example of hybrid warfare, when the advisor-supported insurgents gained British air and naval support, they became more capable and halted the late 1916 Ottoman advance at the Red Sea port of Yanbo, which helped force an Ottoman shift from an offensive to defensive posture. (pp. 49-50)

Among other topics, Johnson explores how Lawrence stressed the importance of “informal organization and dispersal of local fighters” (p 179) all of which made it easier to hide and therefore harder to identify and destroy, while simultaneously bringing challenges to overcome. Local forces also brought their own politics with them, to varying degrees, which meant he sought to understand them to better allow them to reach their potential. After all, his previous notions of warfare as an Englishman did not necessarily appreciate the tribal nature of his new allies and they might depart or refuse to help, sometimes for what an outsider might deem petty reasons. While the British might have considerable resources arrayed in support of Lawrence’s insurgent gambit, they were backing local indigenous fighters as their main agents and needed to think about what motivated them for best chances of success.

By 1918, “Adaptation had become the hallmark of Lawrence’s operations,” an example was that his insurgents drew increasingly on British armored vehicles and air support as the war went on. (p. 213) This mixing of the conventional with the unconventional allowed considerable advantages to what was essentially a mounted light infantry contingent. By the time of the postwar talks, Lawrence had fought alongside the Arab insurgents with a goal of their independence, but circumstances went against him, Britain was much more concerned with staying allied with France than worrying about what the Arabs wanted. Added to that, the question of their legitimacy as non-state actors, along with other aspects far above Lawrence’s control, left for a bitter ending.

Historians, politicians and practitioners will enjoy Lawrence of Arabia on War for valuable insights set against the backdrop of Middle Eastern history and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, especially given the modern news cycle’s penchant for stories covering insurgency and counterinsurgency. Lawrence may remain enigmatic and controversial, but his understanding and employment of hybrid warfare is particularly relevant now, given recent conflicts, which highlight the importance of emerging warfare threats fueled with new and rising technological advantages.

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Our Reviewer: Professor Schultz (Luzerne CC) has taught history and political science to community college undergraduates for over 20 years. Specializing in military history, particularly World War II and the Cold War-era, he has presented papers at the McMullen Naval History Symposium, the Society for Military History Annual Meetings, the Midwestern History Conference, and other venues. He contributed Chapter 12 “The Reich Strikes Back: German Victory in the Dodecanese, October-November 1943” to On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare, edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2020). His previous reviews for us include Warrior Spirit: The Story of Native American Patriotism and Heroism, Home Run: Allied Escape and Evasion in World War II, The Spanish Blue Division on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945, The ‘Blue Squadrons’: The Spanish in the Luftwaffe, Malta’s Savior: Operation Pedestal, and Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy.

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Note: Lawrence of Arabia on War is also available in e-editions.

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