October 23, 2025:
Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) has, since World War I (1914–1918), sought unsuccessfully to determine the effectiveness of air strikes. During World War II (1939–1945), air and ground forces that depended on BDA were increasingly frustrated by their inability to obtain timely and accurate information on the effectiveness of their bombing campaigns. This caused problems within air forces and with the ground forces they supported.
The U.S. Air Force has a well-deserved and understandable reputation for advocating military victory achieved primarily through air power. They still do, despite a historical record that does not always support this view. That said, the Air Force has some solid accomplishments to its credit. In some areas, it has been extremely successful, including gaining and maintaining air supremacy in every American war since 1945.
However, when it comes to influencing the war on the ground, the Air Force is much less dominant. Blame it on BDA—the process of determining what to bomb and assessing the impact on the enemy afterward. Air Force leaders were frequently deceived by those on the ground being bombed. This began during World War II, when air forces used large-scale aerial bombing for the first time, particularly against economic targets in Germany between 1943 and 1945.
Immediately after World War II, the U.S. conducted a thorough survey of the impact of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. It revealed that the impact was far different from what BDA during the war had indicated. The Air Force vowed to improve, but experiences in Korea (1950–1953), Vietnam (1965–1972), Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), and Ukraine since 2022 demonstrated that the enemy on the ground continued to have an edge in deceiving even the most vigorous BDA efforts. The only proven technique for overcoming the BDA problem was to have personnel on the ground, up close, verifying targets during combat. Those with powerful air forces resisted this approach due to the risk of commandos being killed or captured and because intelligence and Air Force personnel were confident they could discern enemy activities by analyzing aerial photos. By the 21st century, the widespread availability of commercial satellite photos enabled media and individuals to conduct their own assessments.
People on the ground have consistently demonstrated an ability to deceive aerial surveillance. Even in the early 21st century, when the U.S. developed persistent drone surveillance, irregular forces proved capable of reducing its effectiveness. This highlights another key point: air power can be effective on the ground, but its impact develops over time, not quickly. The challenge lies with voters and the media, who demand swift victories. In the U.S., this has led to the "Three-Year Rule," where public support for a war, no matter how enthusiastic initially, largely dissipates after three years. If an air campaign cannot deliver results within this timeframe, it faces media and political criticism, regardless of its effectiveness.
Another issue is the differing outlooks of the Army and Air Force on planning and risk. The Air Force views warfare as a tidier and more predictable endeavor than the Army does. In this respect, the Air Force and Navy are closely aligned. Both are technical services accustomed to exercising greater control over their forces than Army generals. The Army sees warfare as more unpredictable and has adapted to that reality. Army generals are often skeptical of the Air Force’s ability to defeat foes from the air, and they are usually correct.
Despite being successful high-tech organizations, American air forces, particularly the Navy and USAF, often struggle to adapt to changes they disagree with. When the Cold War ended in 1991, the Air Force was still focused on operating as it had during that era. However, warfare technology and tactics were evolving. Post-Cold War enemies were no longer large, organized forces spread over vast areas but increasingly irregular forces that were harder to detect from the air. The Air Force adapted reluctantly, partly because the Army and CIA adopted new reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, such as drones conducting continuous surveillance of key targets. Additionally, highly effective American precision munitions accounted for 8 percent of U.S. fires in the Gulf War, 29 percent of NATO fires in Kosovo, and 68 percent in the Iraq War by 2003. After that, smart munitions became standard for industrialized nations that could afford them.
As successful as these new air reconnaissance tools and subsequent attacks were, they did not seem like a suitable long-term role for the Air Force. Other services disagreed, and it took nearly a decade after 2001 to convince the Air Force. In 2005, the Air Force deployed its first Predator drone unit, and in 2009, it introduced its first Reapers. They were following the CIA’s lead, which caused some unease among senior Air Force leadership.
The CIA had pioneered Persistent Surveillance with armed drones, enabling 24/7 observation that allowed analysts to compile target information and order missile strikes as soon as key targets were identified. This led to a growing list of terrorist leaders and their key subordinates being eliminated. Simultaneously, the use of surveillance and precision weapons significantly reduced collateral casualties, particularly among nearby civilians, to historic lows.
Air Force traditionalists warned that such tactics would not work in a conventional war, where enemies with modern air defense systems and jet fighters could quickly shoot down Predator and Reaper drones. However, such wars were not the ones being fought, and it was pointed out that the military must address current realities, not just preferred scenarios. Even in conventional wars, these new tactics and technologies have a role. The Air Force disagreed but lacked a compelling alternative. They continued to push for funding for stealthy F-35s and B-2 and B-21 stealth bombers, despite other nations developing sensors that could neutralize stealth capabilities.
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the war against Russian invaders sparked an unexpected drone revolution. Ukrainians replaced most artillery, manned aircraft support, and many anti-tank weapons with dozens of drone designs. By 2025, thousands of drones were expended daily, while surveillance drones evaded air defenses and manned aircraft due to their small size, low cost, and sheer numbers. These drones were hard to detect and destroy, constantly monitoring the battlefield. When a target was spotted, distant drone operators called in attack drones, reducing targets to debris and causing significant casualties.
Air forces have faced similar challenges before. In the 1960s, U.S. Air Force and Navy aviation suffered unexpectedly high aircraft losses in Vietnam because their aircraft and pilots were unprepared for lower-tech Russian aircraft. This led to aircraft being re-equipped with cannons, as new air-to-air missiles were not yet reliable enough to replace the previously dismissed autocannons.
This experience gave rise to the concept of aggressor or dissimilar training. In 1969, the U.S. Navy established the Top Gun fighter pilot school in response to the poor performance of its pilots against North Vietnamese pilots flying Russian fighters and using Russian tactics. Top Gun emphasized understanding enemy aircraft and tactics, a practice known as dissimilar training. Previously, American pilots trained against other American pilots using American aircraft and tactics. This worked in World War II, where enemy pilots had less practice and used similar aircraft and tactics, and ample aerial combat provided on-the-job training.
In Vietnam, however, Russian-trained North Vietnamese pilots posed significant challenges. The four-week Top Gun program resolved this issue. The Air Force soon followed with its Red Flag school. In the early 1980s, Russia established a dissimilar air combat school, followed by China in 1987. Today, most major air forces use such programs, while smaller air forces send pilots to commercial Top Gun or Red Flag programs, often staffed by retired instructors.
The U.S. Air Force faces another persistent issue that remains unresolved. Since World War I in 1914, when aircraft first became a factor in military affairs, their primary value was in reconnaissance, observing enemy movements while preventing the enemy from doing the same.
Between the world wars, the concept of air power as an offensive weapon emerged. This proved more effective at sea than on land, where reconnaissance remained the most valuable service air forces provided. Strategic bombing was widely misunderstood during and after World War II. Tactical bombing and strafing were more effective, as fighter-bombers provided reconnaissance while attacking enemy forces obstructing friendly ground troops. Moreover, advancing ground forces could often report on the effectiveness of recent air strikes.
However, the U.S. Air Force was not enthusiastic about tactical air power, or "tac air," believing strategic bombing could be more decisive. The problem was that World War II strategic bombing was a blunt instrument, inflicting significant but essentially random damage. While millions of German and Japanese workers were diverted due to deaths or damage to homes and businesses, the decisive effect air force generals sought was not achieved.
The 21st century brought an unexpected advancement in BDA through the use of agents or cooperating civilians on the ground. Intelligence operations began harvesting cellphone photos taken in enemy territory. Soon, troops or civilians were sending these photos to bombers overhead. Strenuous efforts were made to prevent soldiers and civilians from photographing targets before and after air strikes. In Ukraine, cellphones were also used to track air attacks. By 2022, there were more cellphones than people in Ukraine. Civilians developed effective tactics, such as installing air defense apps on their phones, enabling them to record sounds and images of incoming air strikes, typically by drones. Ukrainian air defenses became far more effective due to millions of civilians using these apps, providing real-time photos of Russian air or ground activity.
One drawback was that military personnel and civilians near key targets were vulnerable to detection because cellphones transmitted their locations, enabling the enemy to launch rapid, accurate air, artillery, or drone attacks. It proved impossible to stop all soldiers from using phones in combat zones, as they were their only link to home, though frequent use could be deadly. Most nations enacted rules prohibiting cellphone use by troops in combat zones, but some soldiers and civilians continued despite the risks. While phones largely resolved BDA issues, their use in combat zones still provided targeting information to the enemy. Countermeasures, such as electronic jamming, offered only partial relief.